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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 








NORTH IDAHO RESORTS, LLC, an 




PEND OREILLE BONNER DEVELOPMENT, 
LLC, a Nevada limited liability 
company, DAN JACOBSON, an 
individual, SAGE HOLDINGS LLC, 
an Idaho limited liability 
company, TIMBERLINE 
INVESTMENTS, LLC, an Idaho 
limited liability company, 
STEVEN G. LAZAR, an individual, 
an individual, AMY KORENGUT, an 
individual, HLT REAL ESTATE 
LLC, PANHANDLE STATE BANK, an 
Idaho corporation, R.E. LOANS, 
LLC, a California limited 
liability company, WELLS FARGO 
FOOTHILL, INC, a Delaware 
corporation, PEND OREILLE 
BONNER DEVELOPMENT HOLDINGS, 
) 
) DOCKET NO. 424 79 
) 
) (Bonner County 
) Case 2011-0135) 
) 



































INC., a Nevada corporation, ) 
PENSCO TRUST CO. custodian ) 
f/b/a Barney Ng, a California ) 
corporation, MORTGAGE FUND '08 ) 
LLC, a California limited ) 
liability company, B-K ) 
LIGHTING, INC., a California ) 
corporation, FREDERICK J. ) 
GRANT, an individual, CHRISTINE ) 
GRANT, an individual, RUSS ) 
CAPITAL GROUP, LLC, an Arizona ) 
limited liability company, ) 
JOSEPH DUSSICH, an individual, ) 
MOUNTAIN WEST BANK, an Idaho ) 
corporation, STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Department of Revenue and ) 
Taxation, MONTAHENO INVESTMENTS ) 
LLC, a Nevada limited liability ) 
company, TOYON INVESTMENTS LLC, ) 
a Nevada limited liability ) 
company, CHARLES W. REEVES and ) 
ANN B. REEVES, husband and ) 
wife, ACI NORTHWEST, INC., an ) 
Idaho corporation, DOES 1 ) 




* * * * * 
Appeal from the District Court of the First 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Bonner 
* * * * * 
THE HONORABLE MICHAEL GRIFFIN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING 
* * * * * 
Gary A. Finney 
Finney Finney & Finney, P.A. 
120 E. Lake Street, Ste 317 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Attorney for Appellant, JV 
Christopher Pooser 
Stoehl Rives, LLC 
101 S. Capital Blvd., Ste 1900 
Boise, ID 83702-7705 
Attorney for Respondent, Bank 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(i) NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The First National Bank hereinafter "Bank" brought this 
action to foreclose on a 5.0 million dollar mortgage 
recorded March 25, 2008 against the landowner, Pend Oreille 
Bonner Development, hereinafter "POBD". The real estate was 
called Lake Front on Pend Oreille Lake in Bonner County, 
located at "Trestle Creek", which will be used to describe 
the real estate at issue. The owner, PODB, let the action 
go to default/judgment. There were several other 
Defendants, one being JV, LLC who had the first priority 
Mortgage recorded June 19, 2006 on Trestle Creek and the 
other Defendant was the vendor who sold to POBD, being 
identified as North Idaho Resorts, hereinafter "NIR". The 
Bank sought priority over JV by reason of a Subordination 
Agreement recorded August 6, 2008. This appeal is by JV. 
NIR has an appeal in this action, but filed under a separate 
docket number. 
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(ii) COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
The course of the proceedings in the trial and hearing 
below and its disposition by the District Court involved: 
The Bank filed a Complaint and then an Amended 
Complaint. JV filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Cross-
Claim. The Counterclaim by JV was to foreclose its June 19, 
2006 Mortgage on Trestle Creek. 
JV filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which 
was denied. 
The Bank filed a motion for partial summary judgment, 
which was granted. 
JV moved to amend, alter, and reconsider the partial 
summary judgment, which was denied. JV sought production of 
the Debt Restructure Agreement and Settlement Agreement, 
dated 19 November, 2010, which was denied, except for a 
redacted version. 
The case went to trial; but the District Judge by 
Letter denied JV to participate at trial. At trial the 
judge announced a bifurcated trial, which did not allow JV 
to proceed on its Counterclaim - only on its cross-claim 
against NIR. The action was tried and the court rendered 
its findings/conclusions and a final judgment was entered in 
favor of the Bank, JV filed this Appeal. 
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(iii) STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
JV held the initial first mortgage on Trestle Creek, 
recorded June 19, 2006, which mortgage was granted by the 
Trestle Creek owner, POBD. POBD was developing a golf 
course with Lots to sell at a separate location called the 
Idaho Club and on a property called Moose Mountain. POBD 
needed money for the Idaho Club and Moose Mountain, but very 
little development was going on at Trestle Creek by POBD. 
POBD had no banking relationship with the Bank, in 
California. POBD was owned by Reeves 20%, Merschel 40%, and 
Bolby 40%. Merschel and Bolby had substantial business 
dealing with the California Bank, so they proceeded to get a 
short term loan from their Bank in California. Bolby and 
Merschel arranged for a Bank loan of $5,000,000 to POBD, by 
giving personal loan guarantees and by each pledging 
collateral of cash deposits at the Bank, $2.5 million each, 
for a cash collateral pledge of $5.0 million. The 
California Bank was doing several million dollars of 
business with Merschel and Bolby, but had no business with 
POBD. There was no real estate collateral mortgage at all. 
The loan was disbursed by the Bank to POBD's bank in 
Sandpoint, Idaho by wire transfer. The Bank first deducted 
some financing fees and some prepaid interest, leaving $4.5 
million as the wire transfer. This occurred about October 
29, 2007. This loan was short-term and became due. POBD 
could not pay the $5.0 million loan, so to extend the loan 
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for a term of years the Bank took a mortgage from POBD 
recorded March 25, 2008, on the Trestle Creek property in 
Idaho. The Bank obtained a Loan Policy of Title Insurance 
from First American Title Company of Sandpoint, Idaho. A 
copy of that Loan Policy was furnished and is in the record 
of this action. The Loan Policy insured the Bank for its 
March 25, 2008 loan Trestle Creek, showing it as a second 
recorded mortgage behind JV's existing June 19, 2006 
mortgage for $2.65 million secured on Trestle Creek, in the 
Loan Policy by showing as a Special Exception to coverage 
for item 26 being JV's June 19, 2006 Mortgage. As of the 
March 25, 2008 mortgage to the Bank, the Bank held the $5.0 
million cash pledges of Marschel and Bolby plus a second 
mortgage on Trestle Creek. The only loan money disbursed by 
the Bank was the October 29, 2007 wire transfer of $4.5 
million to POBD's bank account in Idaho. The Bank did not 
ever disburse any more or further loan money. The Bank 
disbursed no money for the March 25, 2008 loan secured by 
its mortgage. 
Merschel and Bolby wanted to get their $5.0 million 
cash pledge released. The POBD manager in Idaho was Charles 
Reeves and he went to James Berry the manager of JV to 
solicit a subordination agreement putting JV's June 19, 2006 
mortgage behind the March 25, 2008 Bank Mortgage, Since 
POBD already had the entire October 29, 2007 loan money, and 
had granted as additional security the mortgage recorded 
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March 25, 2008 on Trestle Creek the issue arose of how to 
turn the Bank's second position mortgage into a first 
position mortgage, so Herschel and Bolby could get their 
$5.0 million cash collateral released. The Bank had no 
involvement on that matter. To accomplish getting JV to 
subordinate its 1st lien mortgage securing 2.65 million owed 
to JV by POBD, Reeves contacted Berry, manager of JV, and 
made representations that POBD was getting a~ loan of 
$5.0 million to put into the development of Trestle Creek, 
condominiums, townhouses, and improvements on the real 
estate, which would increase Trestle Creek's value and from 
the sales produce additional income to JV for additional 
partial mortgage release payments from POBD to JV. POBD and 
JV negotiated and recorded a two-part Third Amendment to 
Indebtedness and to Real Estate Security, and Subordination 
Agreement recorded June 24, 2008 (it is at R., Vol. VI, pp. 
1380-1384). Part of that Third Amendment covered Moose 
Mountain which is not at issue, but for Trestle Creek JV 
agreed (paragraph 7. b) to subordinate its present first 
lien priority to "***a~ (emphasis added) first lien 
priority of no more than $5,000,000.00." The provisions for 
JV to receive partial mortgage release payments was for 
$20,000.00 per condominium and $20,000.00 per single platted 
Lots. 
The additional promises and representations are 
explained in the Affidavit of James Berry, plus 3 emails 
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from POBD's lawyer Sterling. None of these represented 
facts were true. Attorney Sterling himself prepared another 
Subordination Agreement, at Reeves' request and emailed it 
to JV's counsel for Berry. The 3 emails from Sterling were 
all after the 2007 loan and the 2008 mortgage to the Bank; 
however, they fraudulently stated that Chuck (Reeves) was 
working on negotiating a loan from the Bank for 
$5,000,000.00. The Subordination Agreement was drawn to 
look like the Bank was involved and a Bank Officer would 
sign it. After JV signed, no one from the Bank signed it, 
the Bank never even saw the Subordination Agreement. POBD 
never made any payments to the Bank, and when the Bank 
ordered a foreclosure litigation report in 2010 - the 
Subordination Agreement showed up as a recorded document. 
The Bank then seized on the Subordination Agreement and 
filed this action to foreclose its March 25, 2008 Mortgage. 
JV defended on it not being "an agreement", it was 
ambiguous, there was no consideration to JV, and the 
representation, promises, and facts made through Reeves and 
Sterling's emails made the Subordination Agreement 
unenforceable and rescinded. 
The facts formed the basis of this lawsuit. 
-9-
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
I. THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S FAILURE TO GRANT JV JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADING IS ERROR. 
II. THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S GRANT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR THE BANK AS TO PRIORITY BASED ON THE 
SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT, WAS NOT BASED ON 
UNDISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT, AND THE BANK 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
SO THE DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING JV'S MOTION TO 
ALTER/AMEND THE GRANT OF PARTIAL SUMM'1l..RY JUDGMENT, 
AS THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO CONSIDER JV'S 
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND EMAIL LETTERS FROM POBD'S 
ATTORNEY STERLING. 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW JV 
TO DISCOVER THE DEBT RESTRUCTURE AND SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT, DATED 19 NOVEMBER, 2010 BETWEEN THE 
BANK, MERSCHEL, AND BOLBY, EXCEPT FOR A REDACTED 
VERSION. 
V. THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S LETTER, DATED APRIL 30, 2014, 
IN DENYING JV THE DUE PROCESS OF THE TRIAL, 
REASONABLE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD WAS 
ERROR BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE. 
VI. THE DISTRICT JUDGE, AT OPENING OF THE TRIAL 
ANNOUNCED THAT A BIFURCATED TRIAL WOULD BE HELD, 
DENYING DUE PROCESS TO JV. 
VII. THE ISSUES PRESENTED ABOVE, ISSUES IV, V AND VI, 
ALL INVOLVED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT, CONCERNING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(JV'S JUNE 19, 2006 MORTGAGE) OF JV. 
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ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL. 




THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S FAILURE TO GRANT JV JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADING IS ERROR. 
The Bank filed a Complaint (R., Vol. I, p. 65) and then 
a First Amended Complaint (R., Vol. I, p. 122). Both 
pleadings alleged the Bank's Mortgage was recorded August 6, 
2008 and the JV's Mortgage was recorded June 19, 2006. The 
First Amended Complaint, Factual Allegations, paragraph 32 
allege the Bank's Mortgage recording date, (R., Vol. I, p. 
128), and in paragraph 42 alleged JV's interest to be a 
mortgage recorded June 19, 2006 (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 132, 
paragraph 43). 
The First Amended Complaint does not have any factual 
allegation that JV's Mortgage was "subordinate" to the 
Bank's Mortgage. The only mention of such a word 
(subordinate) is in the Bank's Prayer for Relief, was as to 
its First Claim For Relief, which was merely to reform the 
legal description, which includes paragraph 3 at the 3rd 
line down, it states that the interest of every Defendant is 
"***subject to, subordinate to, and junior to and inferior 
to Plaintiff's Mortgage as reformed ... ". (R. , Vol . I, p. 
135) . 
As to the Second Claim for Relief (Mortgage 
Foreclosure) request for relief (prayer) in paragraph 5, 
seeks "For a determination that the lien created by the Note 
and Mortgage is valid, enforceable and existing as against 
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the Defendants and the property described herein, and for a 
decree of foreclosure." (R. , Vol I, p. 135, para 5) . 
Nowhere does it allege the Bank's Mortgage is of any 
particular "priority", nor that it is a 1st priority 
mortgage. A complaint must conform to I.R.C.P. 8(a) (1) (2) a 
short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader 
is entitled to relief. "The purpose of the complaint is to 
give defendant information of all material facts on which 
plaintiff relies to support his demand, which facts may be 
stated only in ordinary and concise language." (Fox v. 
Cosgul.£; 64 Idaho 448, 133 P.2d 930 (1943). "The prayer of 
a complaint is nothing more than a statement of the 
pleader's opinion of what the facts stated in the complaint 
entitles him to receive." (Smith v. Radna, 31 Idaho 423, 
173 P. 970 (1918). This is because, "Prayer for relief 
forms no part of statement of cause of action; facts alleged 
and not relief demanded are of chief importance." 
(Dahl.quist v. Mattson, 48 Idaho 378, 233 P. 883 (1925). 
JV's Answer to First Amended Complaint, Counterclaim 
and Cross-Claim, in paragraph 61 alleged its Mortgage 
recorded June 19, 2006, is first in time/first in right by 
Idaho's statutory race-notice recording acts, and in 
paragraph 62, that the interest of the Bank by its recorded 
Mortgage is inferior to the recorded mortgage of JV. (R., 
Vol. I, p. 191, paras 61 and 63). 
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In summary, neither the Bank's First Amended Complaint, 
nor the Answer/counterclaim by JV allege any facts about or 
the wording "Subordination Agreement". The Subordination 
Agreement was outside of the factual pleadings of either the 
Bank or JV; however the Court denied JV's motion for 
judgment on the pleadings, stating that "The Court has not 
considered any matters outside the pleadings." (Order 
Denying Motion, R. Vol IV, p. 928). Without any alleged 
facts, other than the respective mortgage recording dates, 
i.e., Bank on August 6, 2008, and JV on June 19, 2006. The 
District Court should have granted JV's Motion for Judgment 
on the Pleading. 
The Court erred in failing to grant JV's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings. 
The Court stated that it considered only the pleadings 
however the pleadings being admitted as true were that the 
Bank's Mortgage of August 6, 2008, was recorded subsequent 
to JV's Mortgage recorded June 19, 2006. There is no 
factual basis alleged to the contrary. 
II. THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S GRANT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR THE BANK AS TO PRIORITY BASED ON THE 
SUBORDINATION AGREEMENT, WAS NOT BASED ON 
UNDISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT, AND THE BANK 
WAS NOT ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
SO THE DISTRICT JUDGE ERRED. 
Based on the standards for granting a summary judgment 
it was an error by the District Court. The District Court 
accurately set forth the LEGAL STANDARDS, but erred in 
applying them to the facts and law. The Bank argued that 
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its Mortgage (2008) was superior in priority to JV's 
Mortgage (2006) because of a Subordination Agreement 
(recorded August 6, 2008). (See, Subordination Agreement, R. 
Vol IV, pp. 952-958). 
JV asserted that the Subordination Agreement was not 
binding on JV based on the Affidavit of James W. Berry, his 
Affidavit testimony (R., Vol. VI, pp. 1234-1236) is, as 
follows: 
para 5 - the Bank gave no consideration for its 2008 
Mortgage. 
para 6 - JV had no contract or agreement with the 
Bank. 
para 7 - The Bank never presented the Subordination 
Agreement to JV. 
para 8 - The owner, POBD, through Charles Reeves, 
manager, contacted Berry about August 1, 2008, and told him 
POBD had managed to arrange a $5.0 million loan from a bank, 
and the funds would be used to finish platting and building 
improvements, Condominiums and Townhouses, at Trestle Creek. 
para 9 - Reeves told Berry that in order to receive 
the $5.0 million for those purposes, JV would need to 
subordinate its Mortgage to a new mortgage. It was not 
disclosed that POBD, in 2007, had already borrowed and 
received the $5.0 million from the Bank, and that the money 
was already spent. Reeves did not disclose that there would 
actually be no money coming to POBD for platting or 
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construction use at Trestle Creek. 
para 10 - Reeves told Berry that the $5.0 million loan 
from the Bank would be spent on Trestle Creek for 
improvements and construction that would enhance the value 
of the real estate securing JV's Mortgage by at least the 
$5.0 million. 
para 11 - Reeves promised that the new Bank loan would 
be used to build Condominiums or Townhouses to be sold, and 
that POBD would pay JV for partial releases of JV's 
Mortgage. 
para 12 - The $5.0 million to POBD from the Bank would 
increase the value of JV's Mortgage security and would 
increase monetary payments by the partial releases as 
Condominiums and Townhouses were sold. 
para 13 - JV did not know that the $5.0 million loan 
from the Bank had already occurred in 2007. 
para 14 - JV received nothing; no consideration for the 
Subordination Agreement, and the Subordination Agreement was 
obtained from JV on the fraudulent misrepresentations of Mr. 
Reeves. 
para 17 - Reeve's representations to JV was that 83 
Condo Units and 13 Townhouses would be built on the Trestle 
Creek property using the $5.0 million to be borrowed from 
the Bank, and as POBD sold these, it agreed to pay JV, in 
addition to the regular monthly payments, for partial 
releases at $20,000.00 per Condo Unit and $20,000.00 per 
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Townhouse. The color copy drawings from Reeves given to 
Berry for platting Condominiums and Boat Storage, were 
attached to Berry's Affidavit. 
para 18 - about the time of the Subordination 
Agreement, August 1, 2008, POBD made no more payments to JV 
on its note and mortgage, there were never any condominiums 
or townhouses built, and POBD went into default on any 
payment or performance to JV to date (15 July 2013). The 
Bank did not file any Affidavit(s) contravening Berry's 
Affidavit. 
JV further submitted its Memorandum in Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, and 
attached four (4) different documents which were the Bank's 
records of the 2007 loan, the money disbursement from the 
Bank to POBD for $4,500,000.00 on October 29, 2007, the 
Loan Agreement POBD/Bank October 29, 2007, personal 
guarantees from Marschel and from Bolby, and the October 29, 
2007 Pledge Agreements whereby Marschel and Bolby each put 
up Pledged Collateral of deposit account no. 101435493 with 
the Bank limited to $2,500,000.00, plus interest (by 
Marschel) (R., Vol VI, p. 1278)) and for Bolby deposit 
account no. 100065580 at the Bank - $2,500,000.00. (R., Vol. 
Vi, p 1293). 
The October 29, 2007 loan to POBD by the Bank, had no 
real estate security, but it had personal guarantees of 
Bolby and Marschel, and the Pledged Collateral accounts at 
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the Bank ($2.5 million each) totaling $5,000,000.00 posted 
as cash collateral. 
The Bank did not file any motion, objection, or 
affidavit contesting Berry' Affidavit for JV. The hearing 
on the Bank's Motion was telephonically on July 29, 2013 and 
it is transcribed at Tr., Vol. 1, pp. 14-55. At the 
argument, JV's attorney pointed out that the Subordination 
Agreement was recorded by First American Title, a non-party 
to it. There was a place on the Subordination Agreement for 
signature of the Bank by Name: ______ ~(_N_i_r_a_j_Ma_h_a_h_a_r_a-J~·>-, 
Title: Senior Relationship Manager, but it was NOT signed 
for the Bank by Niraj Mahaharaj, or at all. (Subordination 
Agreement, R., Vol. 4, p. 954). The Subordination Agreement 
was only signed by JV, by its managers, and for POBD, by 
Charles Reeves, its President. The Bank's actual loan 
documents had no wording about getting a real estate 
mortgage or a Subordination Agreement - nowhere. The Bank's 
attorney, at argument admitted the loan documents do not use 
the word subordination. (Tr., Vol. 1, p 51). 
The Bank, by Affidavit of Terrilyn S. Barron, as 
subsequent record keeper, furnished a Credit Authorization, 
Summary Purposes, last sentence saying, 
"Portion of the proceeds will pay-off a 
$2,000,000 private seller carryback note 
originating from the purchase of the subject 
property in June 2006" (It is in the record, 
R., Vol. V, p. 1035). 
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Obviously, that private loan originating from the 
purchase of the real estate at Trestle Creek is the June 19, 
2006 first mortgage ($2.65 million) to JV, granted by POBD 
at the date it acquired the Trestle Creek property, On the 
same page is "Description: Assignment of deposit totaling 
$5,000M Chip Bolby MMA#100065580; $2,500M, Thomas Marschel 
MMA#l01435493; $2,500M. 
In other words, POBD was to use the 2007 Loan of $5 
million to pay-off $2.0 to JV, which it did not do. The 
Bank being well secured with the collateral deposits 
totaling $5 million. 
District Court entered a Memorandum on Partial Summary 
Judgment Re: JV, LLC, and an Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment Re JV, LLC that the Bank's Mortgage recorded March 
25, 2008 had priority over JV's Mortgage, recorded June 19, 
2006. (R., Vol. VI, pp. 2342-1346) 
The Court's Memorandum is the only "finding/conclusion" 
made by the Court, next to last paragraph: 
"that a valid subrogation (sic) contract was 
entered into by which JV's mortgage was made 
inferior to UB's Mortgage." 
(Memorandum - 4, R., Vol. VI, p. 1343) 
The Court used the word "subrogation", but probably 
meant "subordination". JV submits there was no "contract" at 
all with the Bank - the Bank did not sign the Subordination 
Agreement. The District Court went on to find the Plaintiff 
(Bank) is clearly the beneficiary of the contract, which was 
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never raised by the Bank. The Subordination Agreement 
stated "Creditor agrees with FNB". JV is the creditor and 
FNB is the Bank as a contracting party, but FNB (Bank's) 
signature line is blank - unsigned at all, so there is no 
contract/agreement between the Bank and JV. 
The Affidavit of Jam.es Berry stated that JV received no 
consideration, yet the District Judge found there was 
consideration, meaning he had to have weighed conflicting 
evidence to the contrary. 
At the oral argument on the Bank's partial summary 
judgment motion, the Bank's Attorney John Miller during oral 
argument admitted, in reference to the Subordination 
Agreement, that there is a signature block for the Bank to 
sign, but the Bank was never presented the document to sign 
before it was recorded. (Tr., Vol 1, p. 23, 11.1-5). 
JV's Affidavit of Jam.es Berry set forth elements of 
fraud defined as: 
Fraud. 
[25-28] "Fraud consists of '(1) a statement 
or a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; 
(3) its materiality; (4) the speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's 
intent that there be reliance; (6) the 
hearer's ignorance of the falsity of the 
statement; (7) reliance by the hearer; (8) 
justifiable reliance; and (9) resultant 
injury.'" 
Washington Federa1 Sav. V. Van Enge1en 
153 Idaho 648 at 657 (2012) 
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STANDARD ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
The District Judge's grant of partial summary judgment 
to the Bank was only on the issue of priority of mortgages. 
JV pled a Counterclaim to adjudicate the amount of money 
owed JV and to foreclose its mortgage in a one-action rule 
foreclosure. (R. , Vol. I, pp. 185-189) . The District Judge 
set forth the correct standards, but then entirely ignored 
the Affidavit of Berry as to creating factual issues. The 
District Judge failed to apply IRCP 56 (c) or IRCP 56 (d) . 
These Rules say the summary judgment shall be rendered if 
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, together with the 
affidavits submitted show no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. (IRCP 56 (c)) . Further, the 
District Judge's partial summary judgment did not conform to 
IRCP 56(d) because the only issue was priority of mortgage 
as a partial summary judgment, which was not rendered upon 
the whole case for all relief asked. The District Judge did 
not make any required Order specifying the facts without 
controversy, the facts controverted, the relief not in 
controversy, 
action. 
and directing further proceedings in the 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 135 Idaho 
411 at 417 (2012), the Idaho Supreme Court uses the same 
"Standard of Review" on appeal as is to be used by the 
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District Court's original ruling. The standard is that, 
"[1-3] On appeal from the grant of a motion 
for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the 
same standard of review used by the district 
court originally ruling on the motion. 
Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, OLOLC, 140 
Idaho 354, 360, 93 P.3d 685, 691 (2004). 
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on 
file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as matter of law." 
I.R.C.P. 56(c). The facts must be liberally 
construed in favor of the non-moving party. 
Renzo v. Idaho State Dep't 0£ Agric., 149 
Idaho 777, 779, 241 P.3d 950, 952 (2010). 
When an action will be tried before a 
court without a jury, the court may, in 
ruling on the motions for summary 
judgment, draw probable inferences arising 
from the undisputed evidentiary facts. 
Drawing probable inferences under such 
circumstances is permissible because the 
court, as the trier of fact, would be 
responsible for resolving conflicting 
inferences at trial. However, if 
reasonable persons could reach differing 
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences 
from the evidence presented, then summary 
judgment is improper. 
Citing, al.so to Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 
Idaho 219, 222, 220 P3d 575, 578 (2009) 
(internal citations omitted)." 
The Capstar, supra, 153 Idaho 411 at 416, held that all 
the evidence presented genuine issues of material fact, and 
that summary judgment was not a proper method to dispose of 
a case with so much conflicting evidence. 
The instant case should not have been resolved on the 
partial summary judgment motion. JV opposed the motion with 
documentary evidence and the Affidavit of James Berry. The 
Bank did not object to any of the Affidavit of James Berry 
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and the Bank did not submit any affidavit disputing James 
Berry's Affidavit. The Affidavit of James Berry created 
genuine issues of material fact preventing a partial summary 
judgment. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING JV'S MOTION TO 
ALTER/AMEND THE GRANT OF PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
AS THE DISTRICT COURT REFUSED TO CONSIDER JV'S 
ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS AND EMAIL LETTERS FROM POBD'S 
ATTORNEY STERLING. 
Part of JV's Motion to Alter, Amend, and Reconsider was 
submitting additional facts and evidence taken from the 
actual recorded Third Amendment of June 24, 2008, and 
Exhibits 5, 6, and 7 to Berry's deposition, which were 
from Attorney Sterling - attorney for POBD 
No 5 - Sterling's letter of March 31, 2008 
No 6 
No 7 
Sterling's letter of July 24, 2008 (12:07p.m.) 
Sterling's letter of July 24, 2008 (4:27p.m.) 
POBD's Attorney Sterling's Involvement 
The misrepresentation of facts that were submitted by 
Attorney Sterling to induce JV to sign the Subordination 
Agreement came in 3 emails sent by Sterling for JV's 
attorney's consideration. These were produced by JV as 
Exhibits at the deposition of James Berry. The 3 emails are 
Berry Exhibits No. 5, 6, and 7, in support of JV's Motion 
for the Court to alter and amend its Order Granting Partial 
Summary Judgment, are in the appeal record in R. VI, p. 
1386, 1387, and 1388, as follows: 
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Attorney Sterling email of March 31, 2008 (R., Vol. VI, 
p. 1386. 
Attorney Sterling forwarded copies of his March 31, 
2008 email to Reeves, Marschel and Bolby in which he says he 
represents the Idaho Club working closely with Chuck Reeves 
and his partners (Marschel and Bolby). Chuck Reeves is 
negotiating a loan from First National Bank (the Bank) in 
Monterey, California in the principal amount of 
$5,000,000.00. Berry and his entity JV has agreed to 
subordinate its mortgage on the Lake Parcels (Trestle Creek) 
which is currently in first position, to a~ (emphasis 
added) first in favor of FNB. Sterling states his 
understanding that JV is amenable to subordinating its 
mortgage to any new first which takes out and replaces the 
FNB first. 
JV submits that this email is false because by its date 
of March 31, 2008, POBD (the Idaho Club) has already 
received the $5.0 million from the Bank on October 29, 2007, 
and had spent it paying creditors. A "new first lien" is 
also false because 5 days earlier POBD had already given the 
Bank a mortgage on Trestle Creek for 5 million, recorded 
March 25, 2008, which was then a new second priority lien 
behind JV's June 19, 2006 mortgage. 
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Attorney Sterling's email of July 24, 2008 (R., Vol. 
VI, p. 1387). 
As of July 24, 2008 Sterling is aiming to close the 
initial funding by Monday, but that First National Bank has 
been very, very, slow in responding. 
JV submits this is false because the Bank's second 
priority mortgage was already recorded March 25, 2008, 4 
months previous. 
Berry Exhibit (R., Vol. VI at page 1388). 
Attorney Sterling writes to JV's attorney and copies 
Mr. Reeves, dated July 24, 2008. He states Mr. Reeves has 
obtained a loan commitment. Reeves/Sterling are in a "taffy 
pull" with First National Bank (the Bank), that is causing 
all the delay. At the closing of the first draw POBD 
proposes to leave Jim Berry's JV, LLC deed of trust (sic) 
lien in first position on the Lake Parcels (Trestle Creek). 
This is the security position he has now. POBD would make 
certain payments to JV per the Third Amendment to the Note 
by August 1, after which JV would subordinate its lien on 
the Lake Parcels to the lien securing First National Bank's 
lien. Attorney Sterling recognizes that JV had requested a 
title report, but Sterling doesn't furnish it because it 
will confuse matters more, and because it does not show the 
Third Amendment to the JV note. It shows a subordination 
which will be cancelled at close of escrow. 
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JV submits that even though Attorney Sterling on July 
24, 2008 states the title commitment does not show the 
recorded Third Amendment, it was in fact recorded June 24, 
2008. It is also false, because the Bank had the Loan 
Policy of Title Insurance insuring the Bank's March 25, 2008 
recorded Mortgage, "subject to", Special Exception No. 26 
from the coverage by reason of JV's June 19, 2006 recorded 
first priority loan. 
JV made a Motion to Alter and Amend the Partial Summary 
Judgment Re: JV, LLC and a Motion to Reconsider (R. Vol VI, 
pp. 1361-1388) and supported it with a Memorandum and 
supporting documents from depositions of Berry and of 
Reeves. This Motion pointed out that the Bank filed no 
affidavits in opposition to the Affidavit of James W. Berry 
(filed September 15, 2013). As a fact the Bank gave no 
consideration and did not even enter into or sign the 
Subordination Agreement, the Subordination Agreement had 
conflicting provisions making it ambiguous and it was an 
error for the Court to "weigh" matters and conclude 
otherwise. 
JV's Motion to Alter, Amend and Reconsider, was 
supported by additional documents, including a Third 
Amendment between JV and POBD (by Reeves) recorded June 24, 
2008, in which JV agreed as follows: 
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"b. On the Trestle Creek property the 
present first lien priority of JV, LLC shall 
be subordinate and inferior to the new 
(emphasis added) first lien priority of no 
more than $5,000,000.00". 
(R., Vol. VI, p. 1366) 
JV contended that the Bank's 2007 loan of $5.0 million, 
and the Bank's second priority mortgage recorded March 28, 
2008 could not be a new first lien as stated in the Third 
Amendment recorded much later on June 24, 2008. Further, 
the Subordination Agreement, first paragraph stated it was 
entered into by and between the Bank and JV for a loan now 
or hereinafter made by FNB. A loan "hereinafter made" must 
be a loan made at a later date. The Bank loan of $5.0 
million had long since been made on October 29, 2007. 
Rule 42 (b) Separate Trials, states that the court, ... , 
may order a separate trial, for the reasons stated in the 
rule. In the instant action, the District Court did not 
enter any "order" about separate or bifurcated trial. The 
District Judge did not follow Rule 16(b) to enter a pretrial 
order, or Rule 42(b) to order separate trials. The District 
Judge's Letter of April 30, 2014, denying JV the opportunity 
to be in and at the trial of the Bank's lawsuit, is in error 
and should be set aside by the Supreme Court and a new trial 
be ordered. 
"It is axiomatic that, evidence may not be admitted 
before an objection is considered and determined," (stated 
in Neld, supra, 156 Idaho 802 at 814). 
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When the trial commenced, because of the District 
Judge's Letter of April 30, 2014, JV and JV's counsel were 
seated, not at counsel table, but in the audience. The 
Court recognized this by saying: 
"***In the Courtroom also is Mr. Finney 
representing JV, LLC. Does he have the hearing 
thing back there?" (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 106, 11. 3-4) 
The reference to the "hearing thing is a 
headphone, hearing aid, furnished by the bailiff 
to persons with hearing issues. 
The first part of the suddenly bifurcated trial was the 
Bank v. NIR, the vendor of Trestle Creek to POBD, as Buyer. 
On the Bank's case Mr. Reeves, as officer/manager of POBD 
testified about the mortgage debt to JV that, 
a) POBD was assuming a note from JV Loans, which is 
referred to as the Berry Note. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 119, 11. 1-7) 
b) the JV loan was probably in the range of one and a 
half to $2 million range. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 119, 11. 16-18) 
c) Reeves recalled receiving, in October of 2007, $5 
million loan proceeds. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 123, 11.1-12) 
d) In March of 2008, POBD proceeded to provide 
collateral for the loan on the lake properties for the $5 
million loan he had just talked about. (lake properties is 
Trestle Creek). 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 126, 11. 19-22) 
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e) The initial $5.0 million was borrowed in October, 
2007, but the bank wanted some collateral, so we gave them 
some collateral - signed the document for collateral on the 
Lake. (Lake is Trestle Creek), which was March 25, 2008. JV 
submits the Bank had 5.0 million in cash collateral. 
(Tr., Vol. 2, p. 127, 11. 1-9) 
Mr. Reeves became subject to cross-examination by 
Attorney Weeks, counsel for NIR, and he testified the loan 
from the Bank was with a gentleman named Niraj Mahaharaj. 
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 149, 11. 17-21) Reeves didn't directly deal 
with the Bank because his 2 partners (Marschel and Bolby) 
had the lending relationship. (Tr., Vol 2, p. 151, 11. 16-
25) Reeves was working with JV to get its Mortgage 
subordinated to the Bank. POBD's attorney Sterling was 
working on getting a mortgage subordination agreement. (Tr. 
Vol. 2, p. 164, 11. 1-8). 
JV, to make it perfectly clear, states the Bank didn't 
loan any money on Trestle Creek in March 2008 because the 
money was already loaned based solely on the credit and cash 
pledges of Marschel and Bolby on the October 29, 2007 loan, 
which was due January 29, 2008. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 173, 11. 
13-32) . 
Reeves, on further cross-examination, testified and 
admitted, 
a) POBD assumed the JV note and never paid it. (Tr., 
Vol. 2, p. 174, 11. 20-25). 
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b) Part of the purchase and sale was to assume the 
note, and then it became our obligation, and POBD was in 
breach of the agreement because it hasn't paid the JV note, 
we are in breach because we assumed the JV loans and haven't 
paid that back. (Tr., Vol. 2, p. 175, 11. 1-9). 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW JV 
TO DISCOVER THE DEBT RESTRUCTURE AGREEMENT AND 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, DATED 19 NOVEMBER, 2010 
BETWEEN THE BANK, MERSCHEL, AND BOLBY, EXCEPT FOR 
A REDACTED VERSION. 
JV prepared for the Trial which was set for May 12 and 
13, 2014, by filing JV's Pretrial Memorandum, Witness, and 
Exhibits plus JV's Amended Exhibit List A through S. 
At the hearing on December 20, 2013, JV's attorney 
asked for discovery of a "global settlement" (Debt 
Restructure Agreement and Settlement Agreement, dated 19 Nov 
2010) by the Bank and Merschel, Bolby, and POBD. This would 
undoubtedly cover facts of this action by the Bank against 
POBD, as it is the "global settlement" between the Bank and 
POBD, plaintiff and defendant in this action. (Tr., Vol 2, 
p. 95). When JV's counsel, at a hearing on December 20, 
2013 said he had a preliminary motion seeking a "global 
settlement" document. The Bank's attorney Miller said "I 
don't have a problem giving him the global settlement 
document. (Tr., Vol 2, p. 96, 11. 9-11). 
Through discovery, JV had tried to obtain a Debt 
Restructure Agreement and Settlement Agreement reached 
between POBD and the Bank, which District Judge Griffin 
-30-
refused to compel the Bank to disclose, except for a heavi1y 
redacted copy. The Court's Order Re: Discovery was filed 
April 18, 2014 (R., Vol. II, p. 1539) denying JV's request 
for the Bank to produce the full Debt Restructure and 
Settlement Statement, dated 19 November, 2010, made with the 
Bank by Bolby, Merschel, and POBD. The District Judge 
ordered that only a redacted copy (filed under seal) be 
furnished to JV. The Court wrote that "it did not find the 
agreement to be relevant to the remaining issues in this 
case; however the document may lead to discovery of relevant 
evidence." (Order Re: Discovery, R., Vol. VII, p. 1539). 
The Court did not state or define "the remaining issues" or 
how the document may lead to relevant evidence. 
JV submits that the document could not be used to lead 
to discovery of relevant evidence because the District 
Judge refused furnishing the entire document to JV. The 
redacted Debt Restructure and Settlement Agreement, is in 
evidence as Defendant's NIR Exhibit SSS, and in paragraph 3 
Reaffirmation of Obligations - it was agreed that all of the 
terms and conditions of the Loan Documents would remain in 
force and effect. JV submits that clause would mean that 
the Bank still held the 5.0 million cash collateral from 
Bolby and Merschel; however, JV believes the 5.0 million was 
released from the Collateral Pledges, and either returned to 
Merschel and Bolby or applied to other debt they had at a 
Monterey, California Bank. This issue also involves 
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procedural due process. 
V. THE DISTRICT JUDGE'S LETTER, DATED APRIL 30, 2014, 
IN DENYING JV THE DUE PROCESS OF THE TRIAL, 
REASONABLE NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD WAS 
ERROR BY THE DISTRICT JUDGE. 
Shortly before trial, with no notice or opportunity for 
JV to be heard, District Judge Griffin wrote a "letter" of 
April 30, 2014 stating JV and JV' s counsel, Attorney Gary 
Finney, could not be present at counsel table for the Bank's 
case, and could only be a spectator. 
JV then filed a written Objection and Motion to Set 
Aside the Court's Letter to Counsel, dated April 30, 2014, 
and Motion to Reconsider (R., Vol. VII, pp.1658-1667). The 
District Judge did not even take up JV' s Objection and 
Motion, which pointed out that the Court's Letter, not in 
Order form, denied JV due process, notice, opportunity to be 
heard, and a fair trial. Further that any of the District 
Court's interlocutory Orders could still be altered, 
amended, and set aside at any time on JV's motions, as long 
as made within fourteen (14) days of the final judgment. 
JV's Objection and Motion was specific, and pointed out that 
Nield v. Pocate11o Health Service, filed February 14, 2014 
stated as the standard - that the trial court, on a motion 
to reconsider, is required to consider any new or additional 
facts that bear on the correction of the order being 
reconsidered. "A rehearing or reconsideration usually 
involves new or additional facts, and a more comprehensive 
presentation of both law and fact." (Nield v. Pocatello 
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Hea1th Service, 156 Idaho 802, 332 P.3d 714 (2014)). 
The Court's Letter denying JV and counsel to 
participate at trial in defense of the Bank's lawsuit fails 
to comply with Rule 16(b) Final pre-trial procedures. IRCP 
16 (b) states, at least thirty (30) days before trial, the 
court shall (emphasis added) engage in a pretrial process, 
and shall be on the record and any rulings of the Court 
shall be reflected in minute entry prepared as ordered by 
the Court. In this instant action, the Court's Letter 
denying JV any opportunity to be heard or even to 
participate in the trial is contrary to Rule 16(b). Also, 
the District Judge did not comply with Rule 56 (d). The 
Bank's only pretrial motion was for a partial summary 
judgment. Rule 56(d) required the District Judge to specify 
facts deemed established and the trial shall be conducted 
accordingly. In this action the District Court's only 
pretrial order, was on the Bank's motion for summary 
judgment on priority on the Bank's 2008 Mortgage. JV never 
filed any summary judgment motion, JV only responded by 
memorandums and affidavits to the Bank' s partial summary 
judgment motion. JV was entitled to be at the trial and to 
defend and assert its Counterclaim against the Bank. 
VI. THE DISTRICT JUDGE, AT OPENING OF THE TRIAL 
ANNOUNCED THAT A BIFURCATED TRIAL WOULD BE HELD, 
DENYING DUE PROCESS TO JV. 
The case was set for Trial. JV prepared and filed a 
Trial Memorandum, JV's Exhibits, and JV's Witness List. A 
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few days before trial, the District Judge wrote a letter to 
counsel stating that JV could not participate in the trial 
and could not sit at the counsel table. At the Trial the 
District Judge opened by stating, for the very first time 
that, he was bifurcating the trial, first would be the Bank 
against defendant, NIR, and then JV against NIR/V.P., Inc. 
on JV's cross-claim. JV had pled a counterclaim against the 
Bank, which the Judge did not mention. Somehow the District 
Judge seemed to believe that everything was final in the 
Bank's favor against JV, even though the summary judgment 
was only partial on the single issue of priority of the 
Bank's Mortgage against JV's Mortgage. JV submits the Court 
prior ruling was only an "interlocutory" Order. 
The Bank's case went to trial against NIR, without JV 
being able to participate at all. Then JV went to trial on 
its cross-claim against NIR/V.P., which is not an issue on 
this appeal. The District Court's judgments had some 
problems as not complying with IRCP 54(a), which were 
ultimately corrected. This appeal results by JV. 
It is undisputed that the Bank, did not sign "this 
Agreement", did not record it, and did not know where the 
original was located, and it was not referred to in the 
Bank's Policy of Mortgage Insurance (Policy No. 2291210-S). 
The Bank first found out about the existence of the 
Subordination Agreement when the Bank obtained a mortgage 
foreclosure report for this action filed January 28, 2011, 
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about three (3) years after the fact. This document is 
entitled GUARANTEE by First American Title Company, 
Litigation Guarantee, to the Bank, as the Assured, date of 
guarantee is December 27, 2010 in the record at R., Vol. V, 
pp. 1064-1082. This was the first time ever showing the 
recorded Subrogation Agreement in Special Exception, Part 
II, Exception No. 24 (at R., Vol. V, p. 1069) . Rick 
Lynskey, for First American Title Company, in support of the 
Bank's motion for partial summary judgment made a 
Supplemental Affidavit, furnishing a copy of the original 
Loan Policy issued by First American Title Company on March 
25, 2008, the date of recordation of the Bank's Mortgage in 
this matter. The Loan Policy of Title Insurance issued by 
First American Title is Policy No. 2291210-S at R., Vol. V, 
pp. 1087-1099. The Loan Policy, dated March 25, 2008, does 
not disclose the Subordination Agreement, because the 
Subordination Agreement was not recorded until August 6, 
2008. 
The Bank could not have relied upon the August 6, 2008 
Subordination Agreement because its loan of money was 
October 29, 2007, and its Mortgage was recorded previously 
on March 2 5 , 2 0 0 8 . The Bank' s Mortgage was recorded 
approximately four (4) months before the Subordination 
Agreement was recorded August 6, 2008. In summary, from the 
Bank' s own Loan Policy, it actually knew or should have 
known by constructive notice that JV had a prior recorded 
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Mortgage on June 19, 2006, and the Bank held a later 
subsequent mortgage recorded March 25, 2008, almost two (2) 
years later than JV's Mortgage. 
JV points out that the District Judge's statement that 
the "court's prior summary judgment disposed of all issues 
between JV, LLC and Union Bank" is inaccurate because the 
Bank's motion was only a partial summary judgment motion on 
the issue of priority of mortgages, so it could not be that 
"all issues were disposed of". Secondly, the Court's prior 
partial summary judgment was only interlocutory, meaning it 
could be changed at any time, with the cut-off date being 
fourteen (14) days after final Judgment. 
The District Court by Letter said JV will not be at 
counsel table. At the trial commencement, on the record the 
District Court said that it would be a bifurcated trial. As 
to JV that meant JV could only try its cross-claim against 
NIR. 
VII. THE ISSUES PRESENTED ABOVE, ISSUES IV, V .AND VI, 
ALL INVOLVED PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS BY THE 
DISTRICT COURT, CONCERNING THE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
(JV'S JUNE 19, 2006 MORTGAGE) OF JV. 
These two (2) statements/directives of the Court 
deprive JV of a fair trial, without any due process. First, 
JV responded to the Letter by JV's Objection and Motion to 
set aside the Court's Letter to Counsel, dated April 30, 
2014 and Motion to Reconsider. The District Judge made no 
response, no hearing was held, and it was apparently 
disregarded by the District Judge. 
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The Letter and the District Judge's statement at trial 
commencement as to his "bifurcating" the trial, both came 
without notice, without hearing, and no opportunity to be 
heard - at all. This is the denial of JV's procedural due 
process rights. The Idaho Supreme Court case of Bradbury v. 
Idaho Judicia1 Counse1, 136 Idaho 63, 28 P.3d 1006 (2001), 
on the issue of procedural due process holds: 
"2. Procedural Due Process 
A procedural due process inquiry is focused 
on determining whether the procedure employed 
is fair. The due process clause of the 
Fourteen th Amendment "prohibits deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property without 
'fundamental fairness' through governmental 
conduct that offends the community's sense of 
justice, decency and fair play." Maresh v. 
State, Dept. 0£ Hea1th and We1£are, 132 Idaho 
221, 225-26, 970 P.2d 14, 19-20 (1998) citing 
Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 432-34, 106 
S.Ct. 1135, 1146-47, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 428-29 
(1986). Procedural due process is the aspect 
of due process relating to the minimal 
requirements of notice and a hearing if the 
deprivation of a significant life, liberty, 
or property interest may occur. A 
deprivation of property encompasses claims 
where there is a legitimate claim or 
entitlement to the asserted benefit under 
either state or federal law. See id. Citing 
Board 0£ Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569, 
92 S.Ct. 2701, 2705, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 556 
(1972) . The minimal requirements are that 
"there must be some process to ensure that 
the individual is not arbitrarily deprived of 
his rights in violation of the state or 
federal constitutions. This requirement is 
met when the defendant is provided with 
notice and an opportunity to be heard." 
Aberdeen-Spring£ie1d Cana1 Co., 133 Idaho at 
91, 982 P.2d at 926, citing State v. Rhoades, 
121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P. 2d 960 969 (1991) ; 
see a1so A.E. 11Ed" Fridenstine v. Idaho Dep't 
0£ Administration, 133 Idaho 188, 983 P. 2d 
842 (1999). The opportunity to be heard must 
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occur "at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner" in order to satisfy the 
due process requirement. Aberdeen-Spring£ield 
Canal Co., 133 Idaho at 91, 982 P.2d at 926, 
citing Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 
923, 927, 950 P. 2d 1262, 1266 (1998) ; see 
also City 0£ Boise v. Industrial Comm'n, 129 
Idaho 906, 935 P.2d 169? (1997) ." 
Due process is a flexible concept called for as 
warranted by the particular situation. A court must engage 
in a two-step process. 
liberty or property. 
process is due. 
First is whether the interest is in 
If so, the Court next determines what 
Bradbury v. Idaho Judicial Counsel, 
136 Idaho 63 at 72 
In the instant action, the District Court did not 
engage in any of the due process requirements or in the two-
step analysis. JV's property interest was to have a trial 
on matters of its property interest, i.e., JV' s June 19, 
2006 Mortgage encumbering the real estate at issue. It was 
fundamentally unfair for the Judge's Letter ruling and its 
announcing bifurcation of the trial. JV' s property 
interests are created by existing mortgage foreclosure laws 
and Idaho case law. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, 
"The United States Supreme Court has noted that 
property interest, under the 14th Amendment to the United 
States Constitution are created .. by existing rules ... such as 
state law." (Maresh v. State, Dept. 0£ Health and Wel£are, 
132 Idaho 221 at 226, 970 P. 2d 14 (1998) . Idaho's due 
process clause of the Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Section 
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13, is "substantially the same as its federal counterpart, 
and Idaho considers the rational used in deciding Fourteenth 
Amendment due process cases." 
Without being granted any due process by the District 
Court, JV could not establish its property right in its 2006 
Mortgage. Even if JV only had a second priority mortgage it 
should have been allowed to go to trial. The District Court 
should be reversed and a new trial granted to JV. 
Procedural Due Process concerning JV' s property 
interest matters of JV' s June 19, 2006 
requires due process. Under both the 
recorded Mortgage 
Idaho and United 
States Constitution, the right to procedural due process 
requires... "a fair trial in a fair tribunal." (cases cited) 
(Wi11iams v. Idaho State Board 0£ Rea1 Estate Appraiser, 157 
Idaho 496, 337 P. 3d (2012) at 157 Idaho, page 505) . Due 
process is not precisely defined but the phrase expresses 
"fundamental fairness". (Wi11iams v. Idaho State Board 0£ 
Rea1 Estate Appraiser, 157 Idaho 496 at 505). Fundamental 
fairness procedural due process calls for procedural 
protections as are warranted by the particular situation. 
(Wi11iams v. Idaho State Board 0£ Rea1 Estate Appraiser, 157 
Idaho 496 at 501). 
In the instant action, three (3) matters denied JV of 
procedural due process which are: 
1. The District Judge's refusal to require the full 
Debt Restructure Agreement and Settlement Agreement to JV's 
-39-
counsel, on discovery. 
2. The District Judge's Letter of April 30, 2014, 
denying JV and counsel to be involved in the trial by POBD 
against JV and NIR. 
3. The District Judge's announcement, at the trial 
commencement, that he would proceed to try the POBD case and 
then separately try the JV cross-claim against NIR. 
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CONCLUSION 
1. JV's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings should 
have been granted. 
2. On the Bank's motion for partial summary judgment 
as to mortgage priority, the District Judge stated the 
correct standards, but did not apply those standards. The 
Bank's motion should have been denied. 
3. JV's motion to alter, a...uend, and reconsider the 
District Judge's granting of a partial summary judgment to 
the Bank should have been granted based on the standards for 
summary judgment. 
4. The Court's refusal to furnish the Debt 
Restructure and Settlement Agreement was error. The 
"redacted" version could not lead to any relevant discovery. 
This resulted in an "unfair trial" for JV, especially 
because the Court's Letter of April 30, 2014 denied any 
trial to JV as relates to JV and the Bank, concerning their 
respective mortgages. 
5. The Court's Letter of April 30, 2014, denied due 
process to JV. 
6. The Court's "bifurcated" trial denied due process 
to JV. 
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REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
JV requests the Idaho Supreme Court to reverse the 
District Court and its final judgment and to remand the 
action for trial on all the issues. 
0~ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _O_ day of September, 
2015. 
Gary Finney 
Attorney for Ap 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing was served as indicated, this 3:::*:: day 
of September, 2015, and addressed as follows: 
Christopher Pooser 
Stoehl Rives, LLC 
101 S. Capital Blvd., Ste 1900 
Boise, ID 83702-7705 
VIA US MAIL 
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